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Any action requires energy. The body’s
muscles need energy in order to contract
and the neurons in one’s brain need energy
in order to function. In the current paper
we will discuss two presumably contra-
dicting bodies of research. The first sug-
gests that the brain invests minimal effort
in high-demand tasks. The second sug-
gests that we constantly spread our mental
energy. We will refer to these findings and
suggest some important rules that govern
the consumption of mental energy.
MENTAL ENERGY IS CONSUMED
ECONOMICALLY
More than a century after the concept of
mental energy or cognitive resource was
introduced by James (1907), the discus-
sion it creates is alive and well (however
for criticism, see: Navon, 1984; Inzlicht
et al., 2014). Resources can be treated as
the power that allows us to perform cog-
nitive tasks. Reduction in a resource allo-
cation to a certain process can damage
cognitive performance (Harvey, 2013). To
characterize the notion of recourses some
use the analogy of a fuel that feeds our
mental processes (Gailliot et al., 2007).
Others use the analogy of a computer
with multiple processors and suggest that
in order to perform cognitive tasks the
brain allocates a finite number of men-
tal processors. Accordingly, at a given
time, resources are finite, dynamic, and
divisible (Kurzban et al., 2013). Others
suggest that resources can be both occu-
piable and depletable as analogy to a
car and fuel which are respectively, occu-
piable and depletable travel resources
(Harvey, 2013). One of the characteristics
of resource allocation is that it is allocated
economically.
It is clear that if one needs to pro-
ceed from point A to point B, the goal
will be achieved quicker if one runs faster.
However, in daily life you rarely see peo-
ple completing their errands at a run from
one place to another. People prefer to use
their physical resources in an economical
manner and they usually simply walk from
place to place. This observation can be
explained by the finding that an important
feature of locomotion control is the min-
imization of metabolic cost per distance
(e.g., Gutmann et al., 2006).
Since mental operations as well-
consume resources, the brain should
also treat its resources in an economical
manner. Dror et al. (2005), for example,
suggested that when the brain resources
of the elderly decline, there is a qualita-
tive change in the mental representation
they use to perform a mental rotation task.
Instead of spending a great proportion of
energy on the same representation style
they used when they were younger, they
change their representation completely.
According to Dror et al., older peoples’
representation strategies are not as effi-
cient as younger people’s, but they use far
fewer mental resources.
In two recent studies, we (Goldfarb and
Henik, 2007, 2013) showed that even when
it is clear that use of control can improve
the ability to resolve conflicts in a task, par-
ticipants are reluctant to use it. In fact, the
operation of control depended on the level
of expected conflict. When participants
were able to utilize low resource strategies
to perform a task, they did so, even if these
strategies only led to good-enough per-
formance rather than best performance.
Another example of economic strategies
is presented by Kool et al. (2010). They
found that in a variety of decision making
tasks, the participants decided to choose a
course of action that was more econom-
ical and required less resource spending.
For example, since switching between tasks
is a difficult cognitive task, participants
tend to choose a course of action with less
task-switching demands.
Recently, several theories were raised in
an attempt to explain why in high-demand
cognitive tasks people tend to demon-
strate economical behavior. For example,
the intrinsic-cost perspective suggests that
the brain has “a set of preferences that favor
a balance, over time, between cognitive exer-
tion and cognitive disengagement or rest,
an idea that originates in labor economics
and which has been fruitfully applied to
physical effort” (Kool and Botvinick, 2013,
p. 698). Similarly, according to the labor-
leisure theory (e.g., Inzlicht et al., 2014),
the brain tries to maintain a balance
between cognitive labor and cognitive
leisure or rest.
AN APPARENT CONTRADICTION:
CHEAPSKATE OR SPENDER OF LABOR
ENERGY?
Although the need for balance between
labor and rest is obvious in regard to phys-
ical effort, it is important to remember
that physical work and mental work do
not necessarily operate in the same way.
Think of a person who after a short walk
decides to sit and rest on a bench. This
man can now have a physical rest, his
legs are no longer using the resources that
were previously consumed by the walking
task and no other organ will automatically
compete for these available resources. For
example, the person will not automatically
begin waving his hands simply because
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there is extra energy in his system. In
contrast, evidence suggests that the brain
will indeed automatically start a mental
action simply because there is energy avail-
able in the system. This evidence suggests
that the brain is constantly at work, it
spreads mental energy between tasks and
frequently automatically uses the spare
energy left over from one mental task to
operate a new mental task. This evidence
presumably describes cases that may not
fit the economical labor perspective and in
this section we will review them.
In recent years Nilli Lavie developed a
theory of selective attention under load
(e.g., Lavie, 1995, 2000, 2005). According
to this theory, the processing of distractors
can be decreased under a high percep-
tual load but not under a low perceptual
load. High perceptual load consumesmore
resources, so there is less spare capacity
left to perceive the distractor. However,
according to this theory, processing of
interfering distractors would be increased
under a low perceptual load. Because the
low perceptual load does not consume all
the available resources, there is some free
capacity left to be used by the distractors
or by any other element in the field. It has
been suggested that even involuntary or
automatic processes might need resources
in order to operate (e.g.: Paap and Ogden,
1981; Kahneman and Chajczyk, 1983;
Tzelgov, 1997; Chajut and Algom, 2003).
Hence the free capacity left form the main
task can be used involuntarily in the pro-
cess of perceiving the distractors. When
the information provided by the distrac-
tor is incongruent with the information
provided by the relevant stimulus, a con-
flict occurs, performance on the task is
impaired, and RT is increased. Notice that
this theory introduces a very spendthrift
approach regarding resources consumed
by demanding tasks, as it claims that “any
capacity not taken up in perception of task-
relevant stimuli would involuntarily ‘spill
over’ to the perception of task-irrelevant dis-
tractors” (Lavie, 2005; p. 75). The notion
of the spilling over of resources from one
task to another demanding task is also
compatible with an earlier claim made by
Treisman (1969) regarding how the ner-
vous system treats resources. “It may be
that the nervous system is forced to use what-
ever discriminative systems it has available,
unless these are already fully occupied with
other tests or inputs, so that we tend to
use our perceptual capacity to the full on
whatever sense data reach the receptors.”
(p. 296).
Another example of constant process-
ing can be found in a paper by Mason
et al. (2007). This paper suggested that
our brain is always in action. When there
are no external demands for action, the
brain creates or possibly allows actions
that are not based on external stimuli to
intrude. Under these conditions the brain
begins activating cortical regions associ-
ated with wandering thoughts and sim-
ilar to Lavie’s findings, as the external
demand decreases, the activation of wan-
dering thoughts increases. While wander-
ing thoughts can be relaxing and might
seem equivalent to a leisure phase, or even
as a result of allowing the populations of
excitatory neurons to spontaneously fire
when the system changes to a rest phase,
they might not always have a leasiring or
relexing nature. In fact, Smallwood and
Schooler (2006), in their review suggested
that wandering thought can be labor-
ing in nature, unpleasant and depressing.
They also noted that, the moment the
main task releases some resources these
thoughts can automatically intrude on
the system, and unfortunately they can
be extremely resources consuming. “Tasks
that rely heavily on controlled processing
will leave few working-memory resources
available for mind wandering because off-
task thinking also requires resources. Thus,
mind wandering should be less likely to
occur when the primary task is demanding
and more likely to occur when the task is
simple or automatic. Moreover, when mind
wandering occurs in demanding tasks, it
should be associated with deficits in perfor-
mance because fewer resources are available
to complete the primary task” (p. 947).
COMBINING THE TWO NOTIONS:
LABOR CHEAPSKATE AND LABOR
LOVER
We suggest that the cognitive system is
both a labor cheapskate and a labor lover.
Its functioning can revolve around the fol-
lowing rules: (a) The cognitive system is a
resource saver with respect to a given labor
process. In this waymore resources are free
and can thus be used in other processes.
(b) The cognitive system is a resource
spender as it uses some of the spare labor
energy that it managed to save, to simul-
taneously operate other processes that are
not required at the moment or do not
seem absolutely necessary. These processes
can be new labor processes. Note that
those rules can theoretically be accommo-
dated by the framework of recent theories
on the intrinsic-cost perspective or the
labor-leisure balance framework, if a con-
straint will be added in which the sum of
all labor energy is being counted and then
balanced with the rest-leisure criterion.
Figure 1 illustrates how these rules can
work together. At a given Time 1, the
cognitive system has a certain amount of
energy to splurge on labor work. The sys-
tem will consume the labor energy eco-
nomically in order to perform a single
task. The remaining labor energy can be
automatically spread to other labor tasks.
As we proceed along the time line a shift
can occur in the total amount of labor
energy (e.g., due to a shift in motivation,
the need for leisure or rest). However, the
total shift may not affect the consumption
rules of the labor energy: for a given task
energy is consumed economically so that
the remaining labor energy can be spread
to other labor tasks.
Why does the brain use labor energy
economically with respect to a given task
and thriftlessly in respect to presumably
irrelevant tasks even when they are not fun
or enjoyable? As noted, in the wandering
thought theory, thoughts that are active in
the absence of any external demand can
be heavily engaging for the system and
can contain unpleasant contents. Similarly,
in the perception-under-load theory, the
spending of spare resources will occur even
when it actually damages performance.
Since there is no control over the spillover
of resources the outcome can be a behav-
ioral impairment. However it is impor-
tant to note that examples showing that
free resources cause an unnecessary behav-
ioral impairment are not a typical out-
come of the squandering brain. Spillover
of resources can have a positive outcome
as it can lead to behavioral improvement
(Cartwright-Finch and Lavie, 2006; Lavie,
2006). Similarly, engaging in thoughts
driven by the wandering mind, even if they
are not “restful thoughts,” can be useful
for problem solving (see Smallwood and
Schooler, 2006). In everyday life, using
all the available resources simultaneously
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FIGURE 1 | An illustration of how the cognitive system may spread its energy.
at a given moment is certainly useful. It
is doubtful if humans would have sur-
vived if their perceptual resources had
been focused only on a particular relevant
object or on a restricted area of the percep-
tual field. It seems that it is best to focus
on something and still be sensitive to other
things in one’s surroundings even if this
involves hard work.
In conclusion, in the context of the
labor energy available to the brain,
the brain is a local cheapskate and
simultaneously a global spender.
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